The strange inversion of left and right ...

... and how it reflected in a debate on the US attack on the Venezuelan drug boat

One of the most bizarre facets of our political moment is the way the left and right seem to have traded places. Once upon a time, if you admired the FBI or the CIA, you were unmistakably on the right: patriotic, committed to institutions, believing in America as a force for good. To support US projection of power—even with some skullduggeries along the way—was to stand with conservatives. Liberals, by contrast, recoiled at such adventures. I remember the horror with which the left greeted Ronald Reagan’s 1983 mini-invasion of Grenada, denouncing it as warmongering.

But something strange has happened.

Today’s global populist right — of which Donald Trump is the vanguard — wants to burn down the house. They despise the very institutions conservatives once revered. They are isolationist and nihilistic, angry at authority and hostile to experts, eager to rip apart the postwar order that brought both stability and prosperity. It makes labels treacherous: what does it even mean to be “on the right” anymore? Perhaps it is less about coherent ideology than about resentment — a state of mind rooted in the fury of those who feel left behind.

Meanwhile, centrists and liberals have become the defenders of the order conservatives built. They want to preserve NATO, promote democracy, engage in modest nation-building, project US soft power through USAID, the Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe — all institutions that Trump has either undermined or abandoned. They believe in America’s role as a stabilizer, a counterweight to autocracy, a presence that — however imperfect — makes the world better.

The paradox came into sharp focus in a Newsweek debate I participated in over last week’s military action against a Venezuelan boat allegedly transporting drugs headed to the US. I am no supporter of extrajudicial killings, yet I took a less dim view of Washington’s show of force than did my sparring partner, Daniel DePetris — a fellow at Defense Priorities, a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune. and ostensibly a voice of the right. He condemned it as reckless; I saw in it at least a glimmer of America reasserting itself against a criminal regime that has devastated its people and destabilized a region. That inversion — me sounding like the hawk, him the dove— tells you everything about how scrambled the ideological map has become.

Episode two of my Critical Conditions podcast with Claire Berlinski also addressed this issue. Check it out here:

And episode three also addressed a similar, related matter: the horror of liberals in Europe at the Trump administration’s indifference to NATO and disdain toward the Western alliance and the democratic values that once underpinned it. That was all in very sharp relief at a conference addressing these issues which I had just attended in Romania.

And here’s the debate with Depetris.

Tensions are rising between U.S. President Donald Trump and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. The U.S. Navy has increased its presence in the Caribbean and last week Trump announced that a U.S. military strike killed 11 members of the Tren de Aragua gang on a vessel in international waters, denouncing them as “narco-terrorists.” Would U.S. military intervention in Venezuela be effective, either in stopping drug cartels or toppling Maduro? Has the Trump administration already gone too far?

Daniel R. DePetris: The Trump administration is rightly frustrated about the drug crisis plaguing America, which suffers tens of thousands of overdose deaths every year. Yet by using the U.S. military to battle the cartels, the White House is essentially mimicking—and escalating—the failed "war on drugs" playbook that Richard Nixon introduced more than a half-century ago. Bombing small boats allegedly carrying drugs northward may give us a momentary rush of satisfaction, but if history is any guide, the long-term results will be lacking. Tackling the supply side of the drug problem is not enough. And by exercising "gunboat diplomacy," Washington is liable to alienate governments in Latin America whose cooperation will be essential for tackling cartels.

Dan Perry: I'm conflicted on this. On the one hand, killing people on a Venezuelan boat in the high seas without trial looks like a summary execution. Even drug smugglers don't legally face the death penalty, and it's troubling for the U.S. to take lives without due process. On the other hand, Venezuela's regime is a criminal enterprise devastating its people, destabilizing the region, and very likely enabling drug flows to the U.S. In that context, a harsh response sends a message that Washington's tolerance has ended. I'm not so worried about upsetting some corrupt governments. The morality is murky, but the strategic logic of drawing a red line is not without merit.

DePetris: You won't get any pushback from me about the existence of corrupt governments in Latin America. And I take your point on the legality of it all; due-process is nonexistent in this circumstance. But if the objective of this flashy strike was to deter criminal organizations from producing drugs and sending them to the United States, then it's highly unlikely to work. Cartels and the people who run them aren't irrational per se, but they aren't particularly concerned with risk, either. They are driven first and foremost by profits, and if there is money to be made inside the United States, they will inevitably find new trafficking routes to keep the money flowing. The monetary incentives are huge, and I have a tough time believing U.S. strikes are going to change them.

Perry: I'm prepared to take that risk. We'll see what works and what doesn't. Criminals are hard to predict, but governments can be influenced. Maduro relies on the army's loyalty to stay in power, and making them feel vulnerable could rattle his rule—an excellent outcome. I can't guarantee strikes will achieve any of that, and of course the narco-mafia will try to adapt, but unlike today's bizarrely mutated Republicans I support the United States' post-WWII role as a force for good, and the projection of power here makes this a rare positive action by a president who otherwise seems dispiritingly isolationist.

DePetris: I fear this is a case of the Trump administration throwing spaghetti at the wall to see what sticks. It's a wholly reactive, uncorked strategy. In fact, I'm not sure you can even call it a strategy. On Venezuela specifically, Trump seems to be all over the place, which means his goals are all over the place as well. He wants to negotiate with Maduro on some issues like migration and prisoner releases but wields the military stick on others, like drug trafficking. The latter undermines the former. In fact, military strikes provide an otherwise illegitimate head of state like Maduro with the opportunity to rally the Venezuelan population against a foreign interloper. Are we making this man's job easier in the end?

Perry: You might be right, and I understand it can seem ridiculous to take Trump's strategy seriously. In Europe, there is indescribable frustration and fear over the U.S. stepping back from leading the Western alliance—to the incredible point of seeming to actually align itself with the West's authoritarian enemies (as Trump did in recent elections in Romania and Poland). So I see this Venezuela action, perhaps wishfully, through that filter: as a small correction toward a more classic, positive U.S. role in the world. I'm frankly relieved Trump is not aligning with Maduro and doing deals with drug gangs!

DePetris: This is precisely why it's so difficult to pinpoint what Trump is going to do. What he chooses today might not hold up tomorrow—and what he does tomorrow may not mean anything in three or four months. It's also going to be interesting to see whether the Trump administration is able to maintain some semblance of unity. There are conflicting interpretations within the administration about what the United States should be doing in Venezuela. Secretary of State Marco Rubio wants regime change in Caracas; Richard Grenell, Trump's envoy, wants deals on migration, energy, and prisoners. Trump is in the middle, and his tendency to oscillate between one side or the other doesn't help folks like us who would like some clarity.

Perry: Sometimes outcomes matter more than coherence, and now we're at the heart of the matter—I'm a centrist liberal, and my concern is that today's GOP doesn't care about democracy. So I find myself aligned with Rubio in wanting regime change in Caracas. Maduro is that terrible, and I believe in projecting American power and promoting democracy. My hope is that Trump, who you believe is sitting in the middle, veers Rubio's way—because paradoxically, that's also what classic liberals and most Europeans want. And what our old values actually demand.

DePetris: Can the United States cease or even limit drug trafficking through the Caribbean by using military force? That is the real heart of the matter. As much as the administration wants to us to believe it, I don't think it can. We've used the sharp tip of the spear many times before, whether it was in Colombia during the 1990s and early 2000s or in Afghanistan during the two decade-long war there. The results are clear: the drugs keep getting produced because the monetary incentives stay the same. Just as it's incredibly hard to deter terrorists, it's also incredibly hard to deter narcotraffickers. The latter's disinterest in political resolutions means it might even be more perplexing.

Perry: Daniel, I respect you as a sharp and sophisticated thinker, but sometimes it's possible to overthink. Of course force alone won't solve everything, and the drug trade is notoriously resilient. But that doesn't mean we shouldn't go after it with all our might. When I approach the narco mafia, I want to carry a very big stick. Bottom line: on this occasion, I actually applaud the Trump administration for showing some cojones.