The War of Hormuz

MIDEAST BRIEFING: A possible deal, Iranian attacks on the UAE, and the US trying to call two Iranian bluffs at once. Also, promising elections in the West Bank amid an ongoing disaster in Gaza.

Amid the confusion and mounting tensions over a possible renewal of the war comes a report suggesting the United States and Iran may be moving toward a diplomatic off-ramp that could dramatically ease the crisis — while also reviving many of the same controversies that surrounded the Obama-era nuclear deal. According to Axios, an emerging one-page memorandum of understanding would include Iran temporarily suspending uranium enrichment in exchange for phased sanctions relief and broader de-escalation measures around the Strait of Hormuz.

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Obviously, if finalized this could quickly lower the immediate risk of a wider regional war and calm global energy markets, and it will end a period of instability, tension and danger for millions of people. But it would also be a decidedly mixed bag, and will draw fierce criticism for failing to force any meaningful strategic transformation inside Iran. Rather than dismantling Tehran’s regional terrorist infrastructure or weakening the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the deal would provide the regime with economic breathing room and renewed legitimacy — despite having massacred tens of thousands of protesters in January, which sparked the conflict to begin with.

Iran would be totally validated in its strategy of blocking the Strait of Hormuz to rattle world markets, and therefore would be sure to do it again whenever threatened in the future — and it would retain the ability to project influence via prpoxy militias like Hezbollah across Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian areas. And the tactic may start to crop up in other martime choke points globally.

This comes days after the ceasefire declared last month, after some 40 days of US-Israeli bombarment of regime targets, seemed to be falling apart. The Iranians — now clearly ruled by the radicals of the Revolutionary Guards — seemed to grow maximally brazen as a result of their success in converting the conflict into the “War of Hormuz.” In this reframed war, Iran demonstrated that it can disrupt global energy flows, rattle markets, and expose divisions in the West (as Trump, in his disdain for the Europeans, did not consult with them before launching the war). That seems to be the reason Iran did not negotiate from weakness or even caution, but rather like a side that believes it has leverage and intends to use it.

Hence the Iranians do not seem to be offering concessions — not beyond the narrowest discussion of the nuclear file. On the broader issues — proxy militias, ballistic missiles, democratic reforms perhaps — Iran is giving nothing.

The US has essentially been trying to call two Iranian bluffs at once. The first is that Iran can absorb sustained economic pressure and a total counter-blockade of its ports without breaking. The second is that Iran’s mafia-with-a-flag (to quote Garry Kasparov) would rather not have the war resume. It was certainly at least feigning indifference — and if the Axios report is true, it worked.

Iran will have proven that the West is not ready for a major war and will break first. To make the point, this week it hit at what it believes to be the region’s weakest link, the UAE. (Iran believes this because the UAE is an epically successful sandlot with a business model that depends on no taxes and total stability, with great amenities that are not being bombed by jihadists.)

If the reported deal does not materialize, a return to “kinetic action” would have among its objective the removal of the new hardline IRGC leadership cadre in hopes of a transition to a different cohort — a “third regime” that might be more pragmatic. One that might, indeed, live in the konwn Euclidean universe – as, say, President Massoud Pezeshkian, a heart surgeon by training, seems to. Good luck.

The Price of Collapse: How One Decision Unleashed Iran’s Nuclear Threshold

Pay attention to the shocking piece about Iran’s nuclear enrichment in the New York Times, by David Sanger and William Broad. It is an indictment not just of Iran, but of the strategic failure that helped create the current crisis: Trump’s disastrous 2018 decision to walk away from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action unleashed Iran’s nuclear program. At the time, Iran had less than a single bomb’s worth of enriched uranium. Today, according to the report, it has roughly 11 tons across varying levels of enrichment — an industrial-scale stockpile that dwarfs what existed before. Iran has moved from a constrained program under tight inspection to what is effectively a threshold nuclear state, with material that — if further enriched, slightly — could produce scores of weapons.

Inconveniently, no one outside the regime seems to really know where much of it is. After the 2025 strikes on sites like Natanz and Fordow, significant quantities of enriched uranium may have been moved, buried, or hidden in hardened underground facilities. These are not easy targets. And the military campaign — while posting huge tactical successes — has not solved the problem. Intelligence assessments suggest that Iran’s timeline to a bomb has not fundamentally changed; at best, it has been delayed modestly.

All this puts paid to the idea that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon – these are lies. There is no other reason to have ever enriched at a 60 percent level, which Iran does not even deny it did. And incredibly, the regime has mortgaged a large part of its future on nuclear capability. The report assesses that $1 trillion dollars was spent or lost because of this thirty-year conflict with the world; that is about four years’ worth of Iran’s pre-war GDP (which itself is pathetic – less than half of Israel’s with a population almost nine times larger).

Notice that the politics of the revelation are not so predictable or clear. On one hand, yes, it makes clear that Trump’s canning of the JCPOA was one of the stupidest acts in memory – largely caused by his hatred of anything Obama did, and compelled by lies and machinations from Netanyahu (of course, the Trump 2.0 agenda has dramatically raised the bar on that superlative). On the other hand, it makes clear that there is an emergency to deal with, and in that way can be seen as justifying the war, and the blockade.

Zarif’s Offer — and Why It’s Problematic

Pay attention also to an article in Foreign Affairs by former Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who was the lead Iranian negotiator for the JCPOA, In it he lays out a framework for ending the war – from a regime stooge, yes, but from one who is at least not part of the IRGC. If the report about an emerging framework is correct, then Zarif’s position would in effect have prevailed.

It rests on the premise that the world should be prepared to accept a limited, civilian nuclear program in Iran – and leave the regime alone, ending its economic and financial isolation (a.k.a., the sanctions). The first part is defensible, the second part is abhorrent but also strangely defensible. It is the unsaid part that for many is a deal-breaker. Let’s examine.

First, on the nuclear issue. Iran, as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has in theory the right to enrich at a civilian level, for research of medical purposes and so on. It’s not automatic, because bad faith can get in the way of that right, but if the inspection regime is tough enough, this should be on the table. Trump’s insistence on “no enrichment” is either unfair or, more likely, a bargaining chip.

But the unfreezing of assets, removal of sanctions and extension of life to the regime? This is very hard to take. It’s defensible because the West does not go around deposing every government that abuses its own people – you’d have to attack not only Azerbaijan and North Korea and Rwanda and Cuba but also China and of course Russia. Still, a regime that just killed many thousands of protestors starts to test the limits of that sovereignty-based idea. And then there is the fact that it also abuses its region. This is the unsaid part.

Iran has actually been attacking the region for decades via its network of proxy militias, some of the full-on jihadist, which have fomented war and misery in Syria and Lebanon, in Yemen, and in the Palestinian areas, and caused no end to problems in Iraq and to a degree in Jordan as well. Hezbollah in Lebanon/Syria and Hamas with its permanent war with Israel have been especially devastating. Hamas is the main reason there is no Palestinian state, and Hezbollah has absolutely devastated Lebanon, making a mockery of any notion of sovereignty in that country. It would be conservative to attach a million deaths to these groups. And the Zarif plan would allow Iran to continue this madness.

Does Zarif speak for anyone, still? What complicates the picture is that “the regime” is not a single, coherent actor. Iran’s system is a dense web of overlapping institutions, personalities, and power centers, in which authority is diffuse and often negotiated rather than dictated. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps itself is not a monolith; it spans military, economic, and political domains, and does not reliably speak with one voice. Figures who appear as hard-liners in one context may act as pragmatic dealmakers in another, and individuals straddle the civilian–military divide in ways that defy Western categories. Even senior officials derive influence from multiple, sometimes competing, institutional bases, and decision-making can reflect a messy process of bargaining among factions rather than a clear chain of command.

A Quiet Signal from the West Bank

Buried in the headlines about war, diplomacy, and regional brinkmanship was a small-seeming but important development: Palestinian municipal elections that might appear routine think are routine, but are anything but.

West Bank turnout hovered around 56 percent, a figure that suggests not enthusiasm so much as persistence. People showed up. They voted. Civic life, battered but intact, continued. That alone is notable after years of political paralysis and amid the aftershocks of a devastating regional conflict.

Candidates were required to accept the program of the Palestine Liberation Organization—recognition of Israel and the renunciation of armed struggle. In effect, the elections were conducted within a framework that explicitly privileges diplomacy over violence, sidelining Hamas and other rejectionist actors.

Despite the constraints, there was no boycott, and voters participated in a system anchored, however imperfectly, in the logic of coexistence. That is a signal that Israel would be wise to heed. The current Israeli leadership wouldn’t know wisdom if it hit them on the head.

The leadership of Mahmoud Abbas is hardly inspiring. He is aging, cautious, and widely seen as corrupt and ineffective. But he has been courageous in recognizing Israel, in explaining that a return of Palestinians to pre-state areas is not in the cards, and with sticking to the peace framework despite the disaster in Gaza.

And in Gaza, a mess: no reconstruction, no meaningful aid surge, and no political horizon — because Hamas will not budge. As long as it refuses to disarm, the basic conditions for rebuilding remain absent, and civilians continue to bear the cost of that stalemate. Meanwhile, reports point to frequent clashes between Hamas and local clan-based militias, groups competing over dwindling resources, access to aid, and control of neighborhoods. These are not organized political alternatives so much as fragmented actors emerging in the vacuum created by war and economic collapse. There are also indications of infighting within these militias themselves, with casualties reported in disputes over cooperation and authority — and of kidnappings and arbitrary detentions carried out by Hamas against members of prominent families.

So life for the Gazans is a misery. What follows is a debate on how to proceed.

Inside Story: The Gaza Blockage (and the Flotilla)

Israeli forces in recent days intercepted a Gaza-bound flotilla and detained several activists, prompting renewed controversy over the blockade. Israelis dismissed the effort as a PR stunt and a provocation, saying the operation was conducted lawfully and that any aid would ultimately be transferred to Gaza.

The incident has drawn criticism from European figures and activists, who argue the detentions reflect a heavier-handed Israeli approach and broader frustration with the blockade. Israeli commentators, however, say the move risks handing a public-relations victory to critics while doing little to change the underlying dynamics of the conflict. And it was the subject of an Al Jazeera debate between me and Lynn Boylan, MEP for Dublin and Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with Palestine, and Heidi Matthews, Assistant Professor at York University in Canada.

Host Tom Mcrae: Israel is calling this a PR stunt and a provocation and saying that it conducted a peaceful, lawful operation. From Israel’s point of view, how do you read what is happening there? Is this significant at all and how is it being portrayed there?

DP: The Israeli public views this generally as a PR stunt and a provocation, just as you said. It hasn’t taken naps seriously, again, among the public as a major criminal action. It’s simply viewed as part of the blizzard of politicking and propaganda that has arisen around everything to do with Israel and Gaza. Why the government has chosen to be more litigious in this case or so it would appear, just as your other guest said, I too can only speculate because they haven’t explained themselves. In a past, of course, for example, in October, the Greta Thunberg show, they brought her to Ashdod. She made a whole big thing of being kidnapped. They let her go. They gave her a sandwich. And the aid, I believe, that wasn’t a flutella to the extent that that existed, was indeed sent to Gaza, I think. I can’t follow it, but that’s the claim. Is this a better way to be? Does it matter that much? If safe is a member of a group that affiliated with Hamas, are they gonna get intelligence out of him? I really cannot say. I would note that this particular Israeli government has seemed especially ham-fisted about its own, the damage it causes itself, reputationally. And it’s not surprising to me that they’re, by no means, trying to explain themselves and essentially handing a PR victory to their critics. That’s where it appears to stand right now, whether it might turn out that the two detainees are master terrorists I cannot say.

TM: Lynn, I know that you’ve been outspoken about this. What was your reaction when you saw the way that the Israeli authorities have handled this? And what does it really say about the relationship between Israel and European leaders?

LB: Well, I suppose the first thing to say is that the activists shouldn’t have to get on a boat. They shouldn’t have to put their lives in danger. If the European institutions and the international world were actually doing their job at holding Israel to account for the illegal blockade of Gaza. So people have only put their lives at risk on these boats because they feel so frustrated and heartbroken at the failure of governments across the world to hold Israel to account. I think what we’ve seen with the much more heavy-handed approach by Israel is probably one sense of frustration by Israel that the activists aren’t going away, that the drive and the support that the international community has for Palestine is not diminishing.

HM: Focusing on demonizing these two organizers in a way lets Israel off the hook of having to actually deal again with the hundreds of participants who were volunteering from all walks of life in order to do what Lynne has adequately or excellently described as attempting to break what is an unlawful blockade. And when we say an unlawful blockade, what we mean is this is a blockade that has the effect of disproportionately negatively affecting the civilian population, namely by being a key tool in the arsenal of Israeli leaders’ starvation campaign.

TM: Dan, you said that the Israeli government has dealt with this in a ham-fisted way. Does it care or is it worried about its relationship with Europe, seeing that these two men are European nationals?

DP: I think it does, and I also think it doesn’t as much as it should. I think in Israel there is an exaggerated sense that Europe is lost, which is false. Europe is Israel’s primary trading partner. Europe is critical for Israel. Israel remains an associate member, in a way, of the European Union. Israel faces a complex situation, and I fear that what we’re hearing from my two esteemed fellow guests is a highly simplistic narrative. That, too, is part of the equation. What are they supposed to do? They are blockading Gaza. This is seen by some as illegal, but was seen by the Palmer Report in 2011 as legal. It is not so clear what any of us would do if we were in charge of dealing with that situation. Hamas is an organization dedicated, A, to Israel’s destruction, and B, to running a jihadist theocracy of sorts in Gaza. If Lynn Boylan and others were truly concerned about the welfare of the Palestinian people, they’d be working to implement the plan presented by the US last fall that was supported by everyone, including the Arab League, that is aimed at dislodging Hamas from Gaza, because, for God’s sake, you have to be spectacularly ignorant of history to not know that the blockade was A) imposed because Hamas took over Gaza, intending to use it as a platform to bombard Israel and attack Israel, and B) that the same blockade is only a true blockade, because Egypt completes the encirclement of Gaza, and I almost never hear these critics talking about Egypt. Why is everyone blockading Gaza? Why do people not want materiel to go into Gaza? It’s not to starve of the population, no matter what some idiot Israeli minister at some point said about pressuring Hamas in that way. They want to smoke out Hamas. That is the essence. And anyone who’s favors the Palestinians but misses that essence is doing the Palestinians no favors at all.

TM: Lynn I can see that you’re desperate to jump in here. I want to give you a right to respond to what Dan just said.

LB: Well, I think first and foremost, you cannot defend the collective punishment of the Palestinian people. That is against international law, and that is what Israel is doing in Gaza. There is no Hamas in the West Bank, and they’re there with the brutal, violent, illegal settlers who are aided and abetted by the Israeli defense forces. So Israel is committing numerous international crimes and has not been held to account. And that is why it feels so emboldened to continue to just run roughshod across international law. And as regards the peace plan, I mean, Donald Trump is trying to undermine the UN. He’s trying to undermine the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, by setting up this board of peace, which doesn’t have Palestinian involvement in it. And as a member of the European Parliament, I’m not going to defend the setting up of a sort of a parallel system, when we have a very system that yes, needs reform, but that actually is the one that we should be using, which is the UN and that the Palestinians have to be front and center of any future plans for Gaza.

TM: Dan, we know that the US has thrown its support behind Israel, not just throughout this war, but in regards to intercepting the flotilla as well. Is America and Donald Trump providing political cover and is the Israeli government using that to take actions like this against the flotilla?

DP: I think Israel obviously feels it has the backing of the American government. I have much criticism of both the Israeli government and the American government on a whole host of international issues, but I have trouble coming up with a better recommendation than the blockade, which my fellow panelists here seem to think is so illegal and such an attack by definition on the Palestinian people. And I would just ask anyone who really wants to go public with such a position, what on earth would you do instead if you were the Israeli prime minister? And let’s suppose not a prime minister is problematic and difficult and objectionable as Netanyahu, but a normative Israeli prime minister, what on earth would you do with Hamas being in charging Gaza still? Would you block it or not? My suspicion is you would. And then you would face spurious charges of attacks on the Palestinian people with words like international law thrown around with reckless abandon. And I don’t think that’s fair. And throughout my career, I’ve tried to be fair. I’m not representing the side here, but I’m telling everyone that this is a weird and difficult situation with Hamas in Gaza, that it’s been there for 20 years, which has included 2011, by the way. Nothing has changed since then. It is an affront to justice and a crime upon the Palestinian people. And it puts Israel and Egypt in an extremely difficult situation. And I do not think that enforcing this blockade when you say from the beginning that whatever aid is brought in on these flotillas, which are clearly a method of harassing Israel, will be sent to Gaza. How is that an attack on the Palestinian people by repeating such calumny? I don’t think you’re doing anyone any favors.

TM: What, if anything, should it be doing differently?

DP: I think Israel needs to revise its entire approach to the Palestinian, to the conflict with the Palestinians. And that applies mainly to the West Bank. But in the case of Gaza, as I suggested before, I don’t think it has much of a choice but to insist on the blockade and on the removal of Hamas. And by the way, it is true that the US-led plan and the otherwise seemingly farcical board of peace is preventing the Palestinians from having a representation in this process. The interim government that is essentially an extension of the Palestinian Authority, which is the legal authority in Gaza and not Hamas, they are represented. And they were at that showy press conference that was held, I believe it was four or five months ago. There is a genuine effort to find a way, to finesse a way, to disarm Hamas and remove them from Gaza, establishing a pathway to an interim Palestinian government that hopefully with a future, moderate and reasonable Israeli government can engage in good faith talks on achieving a partition of Palestine. That is the goal. The current government of Israel is gonna stand in the way of that. And I don’t expect them to do anything particularly good, but the blockade as such is very far from their biggest malfeasance.

TM: Thank you so much, we’ll have to leave it there - we’ve run out of time. Dan Perry, Heidi Matthews and Lynn Boylan, thanks for joining us.