My Interview with JournoBot

On the strategic drift in the US-Israeli war against Iran's regime

This is a two-birds-with-one-stone AQL weekend update. Call it Iran War meets AI.

As discussed in recent articles and on the Critical Conditions podcast, we appear to be at a moment when momentum in the war may be shifting. The early exuberance (among opponents of the Iranian regime, which include every Iranian expat I know) following the rapid strategic successes by Israel and the United States on the first day is weakening, perhaps even dissipating.

Instead, we seem to be entering a dangerous, costly, unsustainable and possibly pointless war of attrition – in which Iran is determined to outlast the patience of the West by unsettling oil markets and rattling the nerves of Israelis and Gulf states alike with continuing missile and drone attacks (as discussed below with intelligent humans on NewsNation).

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If nothing changes, if there are no more astounding surprises, this may well work for the Iranian regime. What does that look like? Trump declaring victory and forcing a pause on Netanyahu, and the Iranians declaring victory as well. And if the Iranian regime does not fall in a clear and convincing way, gullible people (and maybe even some intelligent people) will buy their claims of victory.

Whether they will thereafter actually be chastened – or instead be emboldened – is unclear, and you will hear predictions of both. Either way, already many are losing patience and accusing Trump in particular of lacking a strategy. It is very easy to accuse Trump – who possibly cannot find Iran on a map, and who this week was forcing Marco Rubio to wear oversize shoes – of such a thing.

Yet it is also fair to note that the expectation that the regime would collapse in less than two weeks was, from the start, infantile and probably unrealistic.

I have been saying all along, since January and before, two basic things:

• First, that a regime change effort is legitimate (which is rare) in the case of Iran, because the Islamic Republic is extraordinarily repressive and murderously brutal to its own people, and has done too much damage to the Middle East with its outrageous proxy militia project (which has impoverished Iranians to boot). There is absolutely no way it can be allowed to have nuclear weapons, which would guarantee its survival. For this I have been pilloried by the usual suspects in the naive global left, on top of some isolationist types in the American far right. I can live with that.

• The second matter involves plausibility. The more reasonable critics have argued that regime change is not realistic and the effort will come to tears. That’s a very legitimate concern. For regime change to happen you need boots on the ground, and since these cannot be American or Israeli – as Iran is too big and such an effort would be too costly and unpopular – those need to on the feet of Iranian security forces. There needed to be below-the-radar talks with elements in the Iranian army especially, which has not historically been tight with the regime, for them to step in once the despots have been sufficiently weakened. This would benefit from the regime being in shock, and that seemed to be the case in the first two days; that momentum has been lost and would now need to be recreated with a new wave of assassinations and destruction of key, visible regime symbols. Unfortunately, it is looking like this critical second aspect, prep work with the military, was not done. This is the type of thing that has caused America to be unable to really win a war for some decades now.

It’s possible that the most attainable goal now is to so suffice with weakening the regime that it will be less able to do mischief and more amenable in future talks (certainly this time truly “obliterating,” as Trump likes to say, its missiles and nukes). I’ve spoken and written about what the offer needs to be (in exchange for terms the world can live with, a massive economic incentive – see the details here, and also it is mentioned in the interview with NewsNation above).

Which brings us to the AI element of today’s offering: my interview with a new product — called groupstack.com, and started by a good friend of mine — that uses artificial intelligence to conduct interviews with would-be experts.

The potential applications of this technology in business, media, and culture should be obvious. The questions it raises are obvious as well. Indeed, we have explored, here at AQL, the potential ramifications, for society, of AI supplanting too many human functions too fast. This is already becoming a massive political issue, and the agitation can safely be expected to increase.

I will say this: having been interviewed on multiple global TV stations over the past two weeks, the AI interviewer pretty much held his or her own. That, in itself, is food for thought for the news industry. Journobot, unlike my perhaps-more-charismatic human interviews, need not be paid, or fed. In a way.

So here is the transcript:

Journobot:

Given your extensive experience, when this war began, what do you believe were the actual strategic goals of the Israeli government, beyond the public rhetoric about regime change and total victory?

Dan Perry:

I believe the Israeli government is largely run by Prime Minister Netanyahu, who is a complete cynic with no ethics or morals, and whose goal is essentially self-aggrandizement and bolstering his political situation ahead of the next election that must be held by October. Sometimes what is politically useful for Netanyahu is also the right thing, and there is a consensus in Israel that the regime in Iran is terrible and that anything should be done to remove it — both as a favor to the Iranians and as a necessary improvement to the region.

The regime not only oppresses its own people but meddles throughout the region through proxy militias: Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and Shiite militias in Iraq. It’s just a nightmare, and anything to remove it or weaken it was seen as worth attempting, especially if Israel’s missile defenses made the price for Israel relatively low.

As for Trump, again, he just wants a win as far as his thinking goes.

JB:

Thank you for that detailed insight into the perceived motivations and consensus. Considering that desire to remove or weaken the Iranian regime, how realistic was regime change in Iran as an achievable military objective from the outset, given the country’s size, population, and regional alliances?

DP:

I think that depended entirely on multiple factors.

One factor was achieved, which is the rapid, spectacular, and symbolically impactful decapitation of elements of the regime. That was achieved on the first day because of Israel’s high-level intelligence and impeccable execution.

But it’s very difficult to affect regime change in a country that big, with a system that entrenched, without boots on the ground and an actual invasion and occupation. That never seemed to be in the cards.

So basically it depended both on shocking the regime and having in place a possible alternative in the form of elements of the military that would be willing to take a chance, seize key installations, and essentially declare a new government.

I had thought that in the run-up to the war this would have been organized by the CIA and others on the ground. Right now, two weeks into it, it’s looking like we may have blundered into a war of attrition. It does not appear as if the preparatory work for the necessary additional stage had been done, at least not based on what is visible at present.

JB:

That’s a very thorough explanation of the complexities involved. Given what you’ve described, and taking into account where we are now, what do you think the current desired outcomes or goals are for the conflict? What would a realistic endgame look like, in your opinion, and how realistic do you think achieving it is?

DP:

Again, it depends on whether there is any discussion below the radar with elements of the Iranian army or even elements of the security establishment.

A desirable outcome is without a doubt the fall of the regime. Assuming that is not possible in the short term because of the failure to organize properly, then what may be achievable is forcing the regime back to the negotiating table in a situation where they are: A) weaker militarily, B) somewhat chastened, and C) diminished in their power.

With parts of the navy destroyed, missile launchers and missiles destroyed or used up, and security installations across the country having been struck, the regime is weaker now. The key in that situation is to prevent them from feeling that they somehow won simply by surviving, which would be negative in a variety of ways — including that they would double down on domestic repression. There has to be a sense that the war could always resume.

For all of that to happen, there has to be a solution to the Strait of Hormuz issue. It’s conceivable that some occupation of the Kharg Island, or the area around the strait, in the mid-term might be necessary, although of course that comes with its own complications.

JB:

That’s a very comprehensive view of potential outcomes and the challenges involved. Moving on, what do you see as the most significant unintended consequences that could emerge from this conflict, whether it was initially intended as regime change or a more limited operation?

DP:

On one level, the most significant unintended consequence was the mistaken attack on a school that killed over 100 girls on the first day, which appears to have been an error by the Americans, on a human level.

On a geostrategic level, I don’t think they intended for the Gulf nations to come under such fire. I don’t think they intended for the Strait of Hormuz to be blocked. But these, while unintended, should have been totally foreseeable and would have argued strongly against a prolonged war. It’s stunning that the United States appears to have been surprised.

Another unintended consequence might be the strengthening of Russia because of rising oil prices. Also, if it turns out that Trump’s actions in Venezuela and Iran completely justify aggressive action by great powers, then it could embolden China to invade Taiwan.

JB:

Those are indeed significant and far-reaching potential consequences. Considering all of this, do you think Iran is more, the same, or less likely to end up with a nuclear bomb now?

DP:

Less likely. There is now such a clear manifestation of the price of that effort. It’s clearly unpopular with the Iranian people. The determination shown by the world—including Israel—to prevent it is now laid bare for everyone to see. Tolerance for it is, I think at this point, nonexistent, including in Europe. I cannot see them actually succeeding in another subterranean effort aimed at acquiring a nuclear bomb.

JB:

It seems we’ve covered all the main points I had for our discussion. Do you have any final thoughts or anything else you’d like to add on the topic of the goals, outcomes, and unintended consequences of the Iran war?

DP:

For Netanyahu, his goal is clearly to win the next election. The big irony here is that it would be great for Israel and great for the world if Iran were thoroughly defeated and the regime fell. The closer you get to that outcome, the more Netanyahu benefits politically. If Netanyahu benefits politically to the point where he is re-elected — and remember he was down significantly in the polls before the war — that would be a catastrophe for Israel because Netanyahu’s coalition is on an absolute collision course with history. In my assessment, if he stays in power—if the right-religious bloc stays in power much longer — Israel’s survival is very much at risk.

On the American side, it looks like this will harm the Republicans in the midterms, which would be excellent for America.