Time to end the Gaza war

Here's how to do it strategically, saving the Israeli hostages, moving aside Hamas, and giving Gazans hope

When Benjamin Netanyahu meets Trump at the White House this week, it should mark a critical inflection point: the adoption of a roadmap for ending the Israel-Hamas War as part of a major realignment of the Middle East.

Sadly, what is actually on the table for the July 7 meeting seems to yet another multi-stage deal, in this case over 60 days, in which all sides will continue to suffer. Netanyahu seems unable to let go, as an end to the war would endanger his coalition. Trump might note that Netanyahu has come to embody the very essence of “forever wars” that he rightly despises. There is a joke making the rounds in Israel: When there is one hostage left, Bibi will insist on freeing him in stages.

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There is a way better way. For all his toxicity Netanyahu deserves a share of the credit for defanging Iran and its miserable proxies that have been undermining a swath of Arab countries for decades. That creates political and diplomatic capital that can yield results – and can rehabilitate. He has room to maneuver.

The Gaza war has gone on too long, and should end quickly. There is no need for another complex phased structure – with the blood-curdling “selection” of which hostages are freed. But if a 60-day ceasefire it must be, that should lead to a permanent one. The last time there was a cease-fire, in February, Israel resumed the war because it didn’t want to end it with Hamas still presiding over the smoldering ruins of Gaza. I assess Netanyahu acted in bad faith, but the excuse was actually not bad. I’d like to outline a strategic solution to this dilemma.

From the beginning, Israel could have recovered the hostages at the cost of leaving Hamas intact and in power. However cruel it was, most Israelis were willing to risk hostages’ safety to avoid that outcome. But such a posture was never going to survive six months, a year, or more. It is now approaching 21 months, and it flipped long ago.

Now, significant swaths of Gaza lie in ruins, with most structures believed to have been destroyed or damaged. Hamas has seen most of its leaders and battalions eliminated, yet it can still deploy an armed mafia capable of controlling the territory upon which it brought such destruction. So there remains at least minority support in Israel for the argument that the job is not done.

This debate cannot go on forever. Ending the war is not only an imperative in its own right, but also opens the door to possible normalization deals with other countries – not only Saudi Arabia but also Lebanon and Syria. Here too, the government and military deserve credit: The thrashing of Hezbollah last year not only freed Israel to act against Iran without fear of rockets from the Lebanese militia but also rescued its two neighbors to the north.

Roadmap for how to proceed

First, agree to a ceasefire and bring the hostages home as quickly as possible and end the suffering of the Gazan population. If it must be done in the framework of a 60-day lull, then negotiate in good faith to actually end the war, unlike what occurred in February.

Second, accept in principle that the Palestinian Authority is the only “brand” available to replace Hamas. The absurd equating by government mouthpieces of Hamas and the PA (which cooperates with Israel on security) is self-defeating. The goal must be to ensure that the version of the PA that reclaims Gaza is improved and strengthened. The desperation caused by the war creates significant leverage to force reforms, and the structure should be supported by the Arab League via a practical, on-the-ground presence by Arab states and also Western powers.

Indeed, Hamas has already indicated that it would accept this. The issue will be the group’s resistance to laying down its arms. It prefers to operate as a militia terrorizing the civilian government, as Hezbollah did for decades in Lebanon.

(Sadly, nudging Israel in this direction will also take some work; its know-nothing government is reportedly instead pursuing notions of replacing the PA with local tribal leaders in the West Bank, seemingly unaware of the failure of such past initiatives going back to the 1980s, and the likelihood that this will lead to chaos.)

So Hamas and the Palestinians must be presented with two scenarios.

In one, everyone makes clear that no Hamas alternative will step in if the group remains armed. Gaza would remain sealed and reconstruction frozen, with only basic humanitarian aid flowing as an impenetrable barrier is erected. Because the place is truly unlivable, Palestinians who want to leave would be allowed temporary refuge in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other large countries; these countries would be compensated handsomely.

Many Gazans would indeed leave – which is a terrifying prospect for Hamas. The message would be brutal but unambiguous: As long as Hamas remains in power, you remain in ruins and the territory will be gradually, and at least temporarily, depopulated.

The second option would be vastly more promising to Gazans.

Hamas disarms, its remaining leaders get amnesty or exile, and the new civilian and security authority described above arrives. This unlocks massive Gulf funding – perhaps $100 billion, essentially in escrow in the Gulf. No more vague promises of aid, instead an internationally monitored and rigorously implemented equivalent of the Marshall Plan, to make Gaza a model for what can happen when jihadists are defeated.

In neither scenario do the authorities in Gaza have the right to rearm with offensive weapons and rockets, or to educate the populace in jihad against Israel and the West, with training camps for little children in which they are training in the art of attacking kibbutzim. There are those who will argue that sovereignty and freedom require getting out of the Palestinians’ way, to let them pursue whatever insanity they decide national dignity requires. That idea’s time is up.

So, what would happen then? My assessment — and I am very far from a wide-eyed optimist about the Middle East — is that faced with such a binary choice, with the second option backed by the Arab League, the European Union, and NATO (Trump can organize it), Palestinian public opinion would move in that direction. It will eventually prevail, and until it does, the first scenario continues.

Israel would need to be compensated for its risks with an expansion of the Abraham Accords. The Saudis in particular will need handling, since they are committed to linkage between normalization and the currently impossible creation of a Palestinian state.

Yet, the world – particularly the United States – has significant leverage. First, the US can offer a formal defense pact that guarantees Saudi security, providing the kind of deterrent umbrella the kingdom has long sought.

Second, Washington can greenlight a civilian nuclear program, under international safeguards, allowing Riyadh to develop atomic energy without weapons-grade enrichment. Third, a sweeping technology package, including advanced air defenses, cybersecurity cooperation, and joint R&D on artificial intelligence and clean energy, which could position Saudi Arabia as the Arab world’s innovation hub.

All of this would happen with Israel involved as the region’s preeminent military and tech power.

Will Netanyahu resist this roadmap just so he can preserve his coalition of ex-cons, fanatics and incompetents? Continuing the Israel-Hamas War is unpopular, and the advantages to Israel of ending it are huge. The prime minister faces elections next year, anyway, in which, absent a reboot, his prospects aren’t great.

I assess that there will be more regrettable attempts to by time (pashed hostage deals with murky ongoing negotiations) and exploration of unhelpful rabbit holes (the West Bank sheikhs nonsense). Some of that will emerge at Monday’s White House meeting, probably; if it frees some more hostages and gets the Gazan people a respite, fine. But it is not the endgame the region badly needs.

If Netanyahu eventually chooses the path I advise, then even if the radicals bolt, Israel’s moderate opposition would give him a parliamentary umbrella for a while. They would probably insist on an agree date for elections a little earlier than the scheduled Oct. 2026 deadline. Who knows? It might even make Netanyahu electable again. In my experience he cares about little else, and a political idiot, quite plainly, he is not. Over to you, Trump; I tried to keep it short.