On today’s edition of Critical Conditions, Claire and I discussed the sudden death of Lindsey Graham, the viability of a hermetic blockade of Iran, the possibility that Marine Le Pen might win the presidency of France, the rather more remote possibility that Donald Trump might apologize for threatening Greenland — and a deeper problem that connected several of these subjects: national electorates routinely make decisions that affect millions of people who have no vote in them.
Graham’s death is a genuine shock, and it leaves behind a complicated legacy. I met him over a decade ago at the Ambrosetti Forum in Italy, where he appeared alongside his fellow foreign-policy hawks John McCain and Joe Lieberman — the “Three Amigos.” Graham made less of an impression on me at the time than the other two. McCain, in particular, was unforgettable: I managed to offend him so greatly in an interview by suggesting that Sarah Palin had cost him the presidency that he simply got up, with the cameras still rolling, saying something like, “Good to meetcha. I’ll be seeinya,” and walked out.
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But Graham’s significance became clearer in the Trump era. He had understood perfectly well who Donald Trump was long before Trump became president. Then he made his deal with the devil, genuflecting before MAGA and frequently making himself look ridiculous in the process. The uncharitable explanation is that he did it to preserve his relevance for ego. A more charitable — and I think plausible — interpretation is that Graham believed the worldview he represented needed a seat at the table.
That worldview was essentially the traditional American internationalist position: the United States should defend global democracy, value its alliances and confront aggressive authoritarian regimes. Graham may have debased himself to maintain influence with Trump, but he did, in fact, maintain influence. And on Iran, Russia, Ukraine and Israel, that was important.
Nowhere is that more obvious than Iran. Graham was instrumental in persuading Trump to take the Iranian threat seriously. The question is whether what comes next will vindicate him — or become part of a colossal American failure. The problem is that Iran has moved beyond merely threatening its neighbors. If Tehran seriously seeks to control the Strait of Hormuz, charge fees for passage and effectively declare economic war on the rest of the planet, then the nature of the conflict changes. A hermetic boycott or blockade of Iran becomes a serious question, and Europe can no longer plausibly treat this as simply another American war of choice.
But Europe and NATO have reasons to distrust Trump. Not long before the Iran war erupted, he was threatening to seize Greenland (which is a territory of member nation Denmark), forcing his secretary of state to spout anti-Europe nonsense in Munich, and issuing a nationalsecurity doctrine that was openly contemptuous of European democracy. NATO’s Article 5 does not require European countries to join every war of choice initiated by a US president.
If Trump now needs Europe to stand with him against Iran, some repair work is necessary. I suggested that he should apologize for the Greenland threats, admit he was wrong, tell the Europeans that circumstances have changed, and proudly lead the Western alliance into joint and coordinated action.
Claire found this approximately as plausible as Trump waking up tomorrow with 50 additional IQ points and an entirely new personality. She may have a point. I argued it is certainly desirable, not probable, but possibly not impossible.
When she asked me to assign a probability to Trump actually apologizing, I said that if I were granted an audience with him, praised Melania and Ivanka, claimed to have voted for him and assured him he was the greatest president in American history, I would give myself about a 25 percent chance of persuading him. Claire suggested that believing this makes me as narcissistic as Trump. I told her she is not the first. But we digress.
From there we turned to France, where Marine Le Pen’s judicial path-clearing for a run for president despite has dematically changed the political equation. Le Pen is a much more formidable candidate than Jordan Bardella, Claire noted: she has three presidential campaigns behind her, an intensely loyal political base and a personal appeal that goes beyond her party. Many French voters see her as someone who has suffered, endured and waited her turn. No current candidate clearly outperforms her in the polls.
I raised the issue of sexism. Hillary Clinton and Kamala Harris, in my view, both lost at least some percentage of the vote because they were women. Voters rarely admit to sexism — or racism — but that does not mean these forces disappear. There is remarkably little precedent for a woman winning a direct personal presidential election in a major Western democracy. (It’s possible, but does not seem probable.)
Claire said this would not be Le Pen’s central obstacle. The more relevant problems are that Le Pen represents a party with deeply disturbing origins, promotes policies that could severely damage the French economy and may literally campaign with an ankle bracelet. Since all things are relative, fair enough; that is quite a collection of disadvantages. And yet she might win.
Claire said that this could be a catastrophe for Europe, for Ukraine and for the entire Western alliance. I quoted Joseph de Maistre’s saying that every nation gets the government it deserves. Claire objected that France does not deserve Le Pen —and that the rest of the world certainly would not deserve the consequences of a Le Pen presidency.
True, the world is globally connected, and the obvious response is some version of global governance. Again, possible in some variants, but improbable. Indeed, a vote for Le Pen would itself be, in substantial part, a vote against global governance. Her voters would be rejecting the idea that France’s choices should be constrained by outsiders, European institutions or international obligations. Same as Brexit, or any vote for Trump.
And as regards America, Claire argued that the United States has assumed responsibility for the country. Washington brought about a regime change of sorts, presented itself as Venezuela’s protector and effectively announced that it now ran the place. Following the devastating earthquake, Venezuelans are not receiving anything close to the humanitarian assistance they need.
Claire said the US broke Venezuela in a way, so at a minimum assumed responsibility for it and now has an obligation to help the people suffering there. It must do the moral thing. I asked whether Trump would provide such assistance even if the disaster had occurred in an American state. Claire answered: not if it were a state where people spoke Spanish. Indeed: very improbable.
Politics is the art of the possible. Yet the possible does not expand unless someone argues for what currently appears improbable. That, I argued, is the role of a geopolitical podcast. Also to be it interesting of course. It is, I think, quite possible.
